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> Context • Challenges by embodied, enactive, extended and ecological approaches to cognition have provided good
reasons to shift away from neurocentric theories. > Problem • Classic cognitivist accounts tend towards internalism,
representationalism and methodological individualism. Such accounts not only picture the brain as the central and
almost exclusive mechanism of cognition, they also conceive of brain function in terms that ignore the dynamical relations among brain, body and environment. > Method • I review four areas of research (perception, action/
agency, self, social cognition) where enactivist accounts have shown alternative ways of thinking about the brain.
> Results • Taken together, such analyses form a comprehensive alternative to the classic conceptions of cognitivist,
computational neuroscience. > Implications • Such considerations motivate the need to re-think our understanding
of how the brain itself works. They suggest that the best explanation of brain function may be found in the mixed vocabularies of embodied and situated cognition, developmental psychology, ecological psychology, dynamic systems
theory, applied linguistics, the theory of affordances and material engagement, rather than the narrow vocabulary of
computational neuroscience. > Constructivist content • This account is consistent with an enactivist-constructivist
approach to cognition. > Key words • Internalism, perception, agency, autonomy, self, social cognition, predictive
processing, enactivism.

Introduction: Internalism
and methodological
individualism in cognitive
science
« 1 » According to classic cognitivist,

i.e., computationalist/internalist theories,
the brain is the most central part of the
central nervous system, where everything
of importance concerning cognition, action, self-awareness and our relations with
others happens. Michael Gazzaniga (1998),
in his prediction that psychology will be a
thing of the past, to be replaced by neuroscience, provides a nice example of an idea that
operates in numerous theories of cognition,
namely that psychological processes are reducible to neurological processes:
My view of how the brain works is rooted in an
“evolutionary
perspective that moves from the fact
that our mental life reflects the actions of many,
perhaps dozens to thousands, of neural devices
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that are built into our brains at the factory. These
devices do crucial things for us, from managing
our walking and breathing to helping us with syllogisms. (Gazzaniga 1998: xiii)

”

« 2 » The related claim by Alvin Goldman and Frederique de Vignemont (2009:
154) that the “central system of the mind […
i.e., ] the brain is the seat of most, if not all,
mental events” represents a similar view. According to this classic orthodoxy, the brain
is where emotions happen; it is where intentions are formed, and actions are prepared;
it is where our understanding of others takes
shape. If there is a self it is in the brain (e.g.,
Northoff et al. 2006), or as Francis Crick
once put it: “You’re nothing but a pack of
neurons” (Crick 1994: 1). This neurocentric
view has become so pervasive it is taught to
parents who want to understand their children. Thus, a website1 devoted to children’s
1 | http://kidshealth.org/en/parents/brainnervous-system.html accessed 17 May 2018.

health states: “The brain is like a central
computer that controls all bodily functions
[…]” Likewise, according to many researchers, improving education involves learning
how the brain learns, since that is where
learning happens (e.g., Blakemore & Frith
2005; Jones 2009).
« 3 » In thinking about cognition, self,
agency, free will, autonomy, social cognition,
and other aspects of mind – and in thinking about when things go wrong in these
domains (as in psychopathology) – neurocentrism (or neuroessentialism) is standard.
Indeed, recently developed neuro-based disciplines – neurophilosophy, neurotheology,
neuroeconomics, neuro-marketing, neuroaesthetics, neuropolitics, neurolaw, neuroeducation, and so on – purportedly help us to
explain any topic. Across a number of fields,
neurocentrism has strong advocates who defend it as the only or best way to think about
such things (e.g., Huber & Kutschenko 2009;
Titley, Brunel & Hansel 2017; Shelley 2013;
Lee, VanderPloeg & Strifler 2016).
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« 4 » In philosophy, neurocentrism
as a form of internalism is represented by
the well-known brain-in-the-vat thought
experiment, which, beyond its use as a
thought experiment, is sometimes proposed as a model for our best understanding of how things work.
Some form of internalism must be right be“cause
there isn’t anything else to do the job. The
brain is all we have for the purpose of representing the world to ourselves and everything we can
use must be inside the brain. Each of our beliefs
must be possible for a being who is a brain in a
vat because each of us is precisely a brain in a vat;
the vat is a skull and the ‘messages’ coming in are
coming in by way of impacts on the nervous system. (Searle 1983: 230)

”

« 5 » In theories of social cognition, we
find a complementary focus on methodological individualism – the idea that we
can find a complete explanation of how we
understand others in a set of mechanisms
that are entirely contained in the individual
brain – a theory of mind module (ToMM)
or a mirror neuron system that automatically simulates the other person’s mental states.
« 6 » Neurocentrism can be described
as a “narrow” perspective on cognition.
The term “narrow” is a technical term in
philosophy of mind. It refers to processes
contained “in the head” – for example,
brain-based representational processes and
contents. Narrow-minded views have been
challenged by “wide” “E-approaches” – that
is, embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, ecological approaches to cognition,
which in various ways argue that the unit
of explanation ought to be brain-bodyenvironment. On such externalist views,
the brain is not dismissed as unimportant
for understanding cognition, action, emotion, human experience, and so on; rather it
is decentered and given a partial, although
still important, role to play along with bodily and environmental factors.
« 7 » In this target article I review four
areas or issues where challenges by these
E-approaches have provided good reasons
to shift away from neurocentric theories:
perception, agency and free will, self, and
social cognition. Each of these is a complex and multifaceted topic, and I will not
be able to do justice to any one of them

here.2 My intent is to paint a large picture
and to suggest that, taken together, such
analyses form a comprehensive alternative
to the classic conceptions of cognitivist,
computational neuroscience. If one thinks
of these different areas of research as four
distinct topics, then one might also think
that these apparently dissociated investigations actually converge on some basic assumptions about how to best make sense
of cognitive phenomena. I will try to show,
as we go along, however, that the convergence of principles reflects deeper connections among these areas. Before turning to
these topics, I will discuss the idea that we
need to re-think our understanding of how
the brain itself works, specifically from the
perspective of phylogeny, the importance of
which was already intimated by Gazzaniga.

Brain, body and beyond
« 8 » The neural reuse hypothesis is an
important and influential insight into how
we understand brain functions. As Michael
Anderson (2010) explains it, neural circuits
originally established for one use can be reused or redeployed for other purposes while
still maintaining their original function.
This hypothesis was originally understood
in terms of an evolutionary notion of plasticity, exaptation: “the shift in the course
of evolution of a given trait or mechanism,
which is later on reused to serve new purposes and functions” (Gallese 2014: 6). A
good example is Broca’s area in the human
brain. The homologous area in the monkey
involves motor functions. Across evolutionary changes it retains these original functions – movement preparation, action sequencing, and action imitation (Binkofski &
Buccino 2004). But, in the human, this area
is exapted for additional functions involving
language and action recognition functions.
Its function in speech production has been
2 | These are all themes that I have discussed
extensively in other publications. On perception,
see Gallagher (2015a, 2017; Gallagher & Zahavi
2012; Hutto et al. in press), on agency, autonomy
and free will, see Gallagher (2006, 2007, 2012,
2013a); on self, see Gallagher (2000, 2013b; Gallagher & Daly 2018); and on social cognition, see
Gallagher (2001, 2005, 2008a, 2008b).

long known and well established (Broca
1861). The presence of mirror neurons in
this area links it to action recognition (Rizzolatti et al. 1996). Mirror neurons are another example of reuse: originally motor
neurons involved in motor control, they are
exapted in the course of evolution to serve
social cognition.
« 9 » This idea of reuse has been appropriated by a narrow, internalist “weak”
conception of embodied cognition (EC).
According to weak EC, neither the physical
body itself (its anatomy, activity, postural
body-schematic processes) nor the environment is an important contributory to cognition. Rather, what is important for weak
EC are B(ody)-formatted representations
and the reuse hypothesis. B-formatted representations are non-propositional interoceptive or motoric representations “of one’s
own bodily states and activities” (Goldman
2012: 74). These B-formats are characterized as “sanitized” neural representations
(Goldman & de Vignemont 2009), and are
sometimes discussed under the heading of
the “body in the brain” (e.g., Berlucchi &
Aglioti 2010). On the weak EC view, the reuse hypothesis is put to use as follows: Any
cognitive task that employs a B-formatted
representation in either its original function
or its exapted/derived function is, on this
definition, a form of embodied cognition.
Examples include not only mirror neurons
and their role in social-cognitive simulation,
but also Friedemann Pulvermüller’s (2005)
language-grounding hypothesis – the idea
that action words, like lick, pick, and kick
activate cortical motor areas that involve
tongue, hand, and foot, respectively. In this
case, motor areas and interoceptive, B-formatted motor representations are reused for
language processing. Along this same line,
by simulation or metaphor, one can explain
the embodied roots of abstract thought
(Barsalou 2008; Lakoff & Johnson 1999).
Thus, “higher-order thought is grounded in
low-level representations of motor actions”
(Goldman 2014: 94).
« 10 » The evolutionary principle of
reuse can get reframed as a developmental principle, in, for example, Stanislas
Dehaene’s (2005) “neuronal recycling” hypothesis, according to which there are ontogenetic changes in the “visual word form
area” of visual cortex when a person learns

http://constructivist.info/14/1/008.gallagher

9

Philosophical Concepts in 4E Cognition
10

to read. Goldman also uses the concept of
reuse to apply to token neural activations
and cognitive events. For example, he mentions “reusing or redeploying B-formats to
execute a fundamentally non-bodily cognitive task” (Goldman 2012: 83), an example
of which is the activation of mirror neurons,
which is “a redeployment of the motoric
format in a novel, cognitively interpersonal,
task” (ibid: 79).
« 11 » In Gallagher (2015b, 2018), I argued that accepting these extensions in the
use of the reuse hypothesis, including Dehaene’s (2005) neuronal recycling hypothesis, and Pulvermüller’s (2005) languagegrounding hypothesis, actually undermines
a purely internalist account of cognition
– across all timescales: evolutionary, developmental, and the timescale of everyday action.
« 12 » Indeed, accepting the concepts
of neuronal reuse implies a strong view of
EC. On the timescale of evolution, reuse has
everything to do with the body – including
its morphological features, which are dismissed as trivial by weak EC (Goldman &
de Vignemont 2009). Specifically, and obviously, the human brain evolves with the human body. Evolutionary changes in the body
that allow for the upright posture, leading to
a restructuring of the skull and jaw, allow for
a larger brain and for the development of
speech. These changes are accompanied by
many other morphological changes involving hands, feet, etc., all of which drive evolutionary changes in the brain, and promote
reuse.
« 13 » Not only the body, but also physical, social, and cultural environments are
important factors, both evolutionarily and
developmentally, for any understanding
of neural reuse or neuronal recycling. The
importance of these non-neural factors is
supported by naturalistic research in recent biology seeking to understand “niche
construction,” “coevolution of culture and
genes,” or, more generally, the “social brain
hypothesis” (Andler 2016: 303–313). Neither brain evolution nor brain development
happens in vitro or in a vat. The role of the
cultural environment, for example, is directly relevant in developmental contexts. This
remains unstated, but implicit even in Goldman’s discussion of Pulvermüller’s work in
neural linguistics – “an excellent example
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of the redeployment of an older (motoric)
system, featuring a bodily format, to help
execute tasks of language comprehension.”3
Activation of perceptual or motor areas for
language and conceptual processing is not
just the result of brain plasticity, but cultural
practices and learning. The roles of culture
and context (including bodily practices and
environmental factors), apply equally to token events. For example, motor simulations
related to word processing in the context of
a sentence are more specific than the meaning represented by the abstract verb outside
of a sentence (Naumann 2016): one would
expect a different pattern of neural activation for the sentences “Bill picked up the
needle” versus “Bill picked up the barbell”
– since there are differences in both neural
and bodily activations for the differences in
grasping (the picking up) involved in such
actions. Importantly, the neural activation
will depend not only on knowing what a
barbell is, or what a needle (or what kind
of needle – sewing, compass, hypodermic)
is, but also to some significant extent on the
history of one’s use of such items, and one’s
skill level, one’s bodily practices (consider
novice versus expert seamstress or weightlifter).
« 14 » Such things are not just neuronal,
but also involve bodily, social and cultural
factors. This requires a reinterpretation of
the notion of reuse. The plasticity involved
here is not just neuronal plasticity, but,
more importantly, metaplasticity (Malafouris 2013); not just brains, but bodies and
environments, and social and cultural practices undergo interrelated reuse or plastic
changes due to their on-going, dynamical
interactions across all relevant timescales.
More than just evolving (in the restricted Dar“winian
sense of variation under natural selection),
we have been altering our own developmental
paths [including our own brains] by making and
changing the material means by which we engage
the world […]. The plasticity of the mind is embedded and inextricably enfolded with the plasticity of culture. (Malafouris 2015: 351)

”

3 | Goldman (2014: 103). Note, however, that
there have been some replication problems re:
semantic somatotopy (Bedny & Caramazza 2011;
Willems et al. 2009; Postle et al. 2008; Naumann
2011).

« 15 » Full consideration of the reuse
hypothesis leads us directly to the role of
body and environment, including cultural
context. The unit of explanation is not just
the brain, not just the body, not just the
environment, but the brain-body-environment (Gallagher et al. 2013). In evolutionary terms, the brain operates the way it does
because it is part of an organism that has
hands that can reach and grasp in specific
ways, and eyes structured to focus, an upright posture, an autonomic system, and so
forth, all of which evolved to cope with specific kinds of environments, and with other
people. Changes to any component of the
individual’s bodily, environmental, or experienced social-cultural context will elicit responses from the system as a whole. As the
enactivists have argued, rather than internal
mental representations or the computation
of information, we should understand the
brain as participating in the overall action of the system as a whole (Anderson
& Chemero 2017; Di Paolo & De Jaegher
2012; Fuchs 2018; Gallagher 2017; Hutto &
Myin 2013; Thompson 2007).
« 16 » We can see this broader enactivist notion of reuse in the following four
issues. Within each analysis the idea that
we can explain the phenomenon mainly in
terms of brain processes breaks down and
we are led to see the irreducible role of nonneural processes. Moreover, perception,
agency/action, self and social cognition are
topics thought to be basic and central to
most other processes of interest to cognitive
science. Understanding how the brain functions within the wider system with respect
to these issues will go a long way towards
laying the groundwork for a more comprehensive and less neurocentric cognitive science.

Perception
« 17 » On neurocentric theories, perception is something that happens in the
brain. Depending on how rigidly one wants
to distinguish perception from cognition,
on the one side, and action, on the other,
perception may be narrowed down to activation of the primary or early perceptual
areas (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile cortexes)
with meaningful content being added by
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higher-level cognitive or conceptual representations, and all of this followed by motoric processing leading to action. This is
what Susan Hurley (1998) critically called
the “sandwich model” of perception, where
sensory input leads to higher-order cognition resulting in action output. These
processes may be conceived as being more
or less dynamically integrated. Perception
may be thought to be an inferential process as Hermann von Helmholtz (1867) and
more recent predictive models (e.g., Hohwy
2013) would have it, where perception is
constituted in top-down predictive processes (informed by generative models on what
is typically considered the cognitive level),
and, in some cases, active inference (when
action is involved).
« 18 » For Jacob Hohwy (2016) and
many others who champion Bayesian
predictive coding, all such processing is
brain-bound, tightly wrapped in a Markov blanket that strictly isolates the brain
from body and world. Prediction-error
minimization (PEM) in the brain does the
important work; active inference (moving
around the world) simply serves the central
processes:

“

PEM should make us resist conceptions of [a
mind-world] relation on which the mind is in
some fundamental way open or porous to the
world, or on which it is in some strong sense embodied, extended or enactive. Instead, PEM reveals the mind to be inferentially secluded from
the world, it seems to be more neurocentrically
skull-bound than embodied or extended, and
action itself is more an inferential process on
sensory input than an enactive coupling with the
environment. (Hohwy 2016: 259)

”

« 19 » In contrast to such internalist
conceptions, phenomenology and enactive
and extended EC approaches argue that
perception should be understood as a set of
dynamical processes that relate brain, body,
and environment. Inspired by MerleauPonty, for example, enactivists argue that
the body is involved in at least two ways in
perception:
 Perception is closely tied to action, and
thus partially constituted by sensorimotor contingencies (Di Paolo, Buhrmann
& Barandiaran 2017; O’Regan & Noë
2001; Noë 2004), and

 Perception is shaped by bodily-affective
processes (Colombetti 2014; Gallagher
2017; Gallagher & Bower 2014; Thompson & Stapleton 2009).
In the case of sensorimotor contingencies,
not only does motor control depend on perceptual input, any movement of one’s body
changes one’s perception. Informed by detailed sensorimotor contingencies, enactive perception is often described in terms
of affordances. In the phenomenological
philosophers this idea can be traced back
to Edmund Husserl’s (1989) notion of the
“I can.” The idea is that I perceive the world
in the pragmatic terms of what I can do, or
in terms of my skill or my expertise. Perception is, as James Gibson (1977) argued, affordance-based. An expert trained in architecture may perceive more affordances than
the novice, or different ones; a city-dweller
may see the surrounding city environment
or a rural pasture differently from how a
farmer would.
« 20 » Perception is shaped not only by
pragmatic affordances related to sensorymotor contingencies – the “I can” – but also
by affective factors of embodiment. Even
if I am skilled and capable of grabbing an
object, I may not feel “up to the task,” or I
may not feel motivated or interested. I may
not see the object in precisely the same way
as I would if I were interested, or if I were
not so tired. There may be an affective cost
that diminishes what an object affords. Not
only does one have a practical (sensorimotor) apprehension of accessibility, but one
also has an affective take on that same accessibility, in terms of interest or inclination
to follow through or in terms of the ease or
difficulty of acting.
« 21 » This affective dimension can be
cashed out in terms of a more liberal predictive processing view where the priors or
generative models are not reduced to brainbound processes but can include embodied, affective components. Lisa Barrett and
Moshe Bar (also see Barrett & Simmons
2015; Chanes & Barrett 2016), for example,
have proposed the “affective prediction hypothesis,” which
implies that responses signaling an object’s
“salience,
relevance or value do not occur as a
separate step after the object is identified. Instead,
affective responses support vision from the very

moment that visual stimulation begins.
rett & Bar 2009: 1325)

” (Bar-

« 22 » This is not just a matter of internal processing in the brain, but includes a
dynamical relation between brain and body.
Along with processing in the early visual
area, for example, activation of the medial
orbital frontal cortex (OFC) initiates a
train of muscular and hormonal changes
throughout the body. This generates interoceptive feedback from organs, muscles,
and joints associated with prior experience,
which immediately integrates with current
exteroceptive sensory input. This means
that the organism as a whole is responding
and contributing to perception.
The OFC’s ongoing integration of sensory in“formation
from the external world with that from
the body indicates that conscious percepts are
indeed intrinsically infused with affective value,
so that the affective salience or significance of an
object is not computed after the fact. […T]he predictions generated during object perception carry
affective value as a necessary and normal part of
visual experience. (Barrett & Bar 2009: 1328).
« 23 » Perception involves whole-body
dispositions and adjustments and what Patrick Freund et al. (2018) call “anatomically
informed priors” (see also Allen & Friston
2018). This implies, first, that perception
is not just action-oriented, or recognitionoriented; it is also reward-oriented, hedonic,
aesthetic, and affective in the broadest sense.
Second, it means that perceptual networks
are dynamically connected to and deeply affected by embodied processes that involve
multiple systems, such as endocrine and autonomic systems (Gallagher & Allen 2018).
Fatigue and hunger, for example, involve
extra-neural processes that influence brain
function and have an effect on perception.
Homeostatic regulation depends on chemical influences in the endocrine system. In
hypoglycemic conditions (which can slow or
weaken brain function) perception is modulated by complex chemical processes in the
body-brain system as it couples with the environment.
« 24 » These considerations lead away
from narrow, internalist conceptions of the
mind, even in predictive processing (PP)
theories. Andy Clark points in this direction:
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In contrast to Hohwy, who makes the “neurocentrically skull-bound” generative model
do most of the work, Clark (ibid: 133) emphasizes active inference–active, embodied
engagement that manipulates the environment in order to reduce prediction errors.
Enactivist interpretations of the predictive
model move even more in that direction
(Allen & Friston 2018; Bitbol & Gallagher
2018; Bruineberg, Kiverstein & Rietveld
2018; Gallagher & Allen 2018; Ramstead,
Badcock & Friston 2018). As Karl Friston
puts it:
We must here understand ‘model’ in the most
“inclusive
sense, as combining interpretive dispositions, morphology, and neural architecture, and
as implying a highly tuned ‘fit’ between the active,
embodied organism and the embedded environment. (Friston et al. 2012: 6)

”

« 25 » As Friston (2013: 213) summarizes, “an agent does not have a model of its
world – it is a model.” With this it is not clear
that we still need to think of the brain as requiring its own model of the world, or even
that we need to keep the concept of a model.
Rather than a generative model, which implies an additional internal dynamics separate from bodily and environmental processes, we can refer to a generative dynamics
coordinated across brain, body and environment. To develop a conception of enactive
perception, we need to understand active
inference in terms of action rather than prediction error minimization (see Bruineberg,
Kiverstein & Rietveld 2018).

Action, agency, and
autonomy
« 26 » The well-known experiments
by Benjamin Libet (1985, 1992) suggested
that if free will does exist it is to be found
in processes that span the 150 milliseconds
of neuronal activation occurring just prior
to issue of a motor command. Libet showed
that we become conscious of the decision or
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urge to move only after some 500–850 milliseconds of brain activity (the “readiness
potential,” which correlates with preparation for that specific action) have already
occurred. This suggests that consciousness
does not play a role in causing the action,
at least until approximately 150 milliseconds
before motor activation. We should note two
things about this result. First, this has nothing to do with free will. I have argued that
Libet’s experiments were about motor control processes that typically remain unconscious, and that free will involves larger timescales and factors that cannot be reduced
to neuronal processes. I will return to this
point. Second, 150 milliseconds of neuronal
activation in pre-motor processes is plenty
of time to generate a sense of agency that is
experienced, pre-reflectively, as intrinsic to
one’s action. This has been a standard way to
think about the sense of agency (Haggard &
Magno 1999; Haggard & Eimer 1999; Gallagher 2000) – as something that anticipates
the action itself generated in neuronal processes that just precede motor command.
« 27 » The sense of agency, however,
is more complex than just this experience of motor control. It also includes a
sense of what one is doing in the world – a
sense of what one’s action is accomplishing (Gallagher 2012; Haggard 2017). Even
more than this, one’s experience of agency
depends on a variety of factors that go beyond physical bodily action or its immediate intentional aspect. It may include the
scope of affordances available to the agent
in specific environments; it can also include
prior intention formation that may benefit
from communications with other people,
as well as retrospective attribution that may
take shape in narrative. Action is always
situated in physical, social and cultural circumstances. Importantly, other people and
social forces have an effect on one’s sense of
agency. Even on the pre-reflective level, the
presence of others can have an effect on my
perception of action possibilities. An agent
may be both capable of and proficient at performing action A, for example, throwing a
basketball through a hoop. Nonetheless her
performance, and her sense of agency, may
be negatively affected simply by the fact that
there is an audience of basketball superstars
watching her. She may in fact feel a degree
of inadequacy in such circumstances, simply

because a specific set of people are present.
Likewise, and in contrast to many analyses
of agency in philosophy of mind and the
cognitive sciences, deliberation, intention
formation and motivation to act are not
simply mental states in one’s head, or causal
brain states. Rather, they are often processes
or states co-constituted with others in processes of communication. Consider also the
effects of peer pressure, implicit or explicit
social referencing, or one’s habitual behavior
in the presence of others. Such phenomena
may detract from or increase one’s feeling
of agency and ability to act. It is also the
case that specific types of long-standing social arrangements, such as apartheid, can
have prolonged effects on a person’s (or a
people’s) long-term sense of agency, essentially robbing them of possibilities for action
(Gallagher 2012).
« 28 » Returning to the question of free
will, I have argued that we should not think
of the exercise of free will as equivalent to
the initiation and control of bodily movement (mental causation), which is the target
of the Libet experiments, and the standard
way of thinking of free will from Descartes
to many contemporary philosophers and
neuroscientists (Gallagher 2006). Motor
control, the body-schematic details of which
we are not usually conscious, is not the same
thing as the exercise of free will. The consciousness that pertains to action is not (as
in the Libet experiments) focused on deciding to move one’s body. Rather, awareness of
bodily movement is typically minimal and
recessive.
« 29 » Given the prevalence of the traditional conception of free will (as involving mental causation of bodily movement),
it may be productive to shift to the concept
of autonomy. The notion of autonomy, at
least, is not associated with abstract motor
processes that make up intentional actions;
it applies to an engaged, situated agent and
intentional actions themselves, described at
an appropriate pragmatic level of description. Immanuel Kant (1996) is the locus
classicus for the traditional conception of
autonomy, which involves self-sufficiency,
self-legislation, or self-determination. Following this tradition, most contemporary
discussions of autonomy take it to be an
individualistic concept. Harry Frankfurt
(1982), for example, frames it in terms of ra-
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tional-reflective decision-making processes
– a deliberation leading to the formation of
second-order intentions or desires. Other
theorists take narrative competency to be
an important part of the precise kind of
self-reflection that informs decision-making. David Velleman (2005), for example,
argues that narrative-based reflection provides a framework for forming and testing
one’s intentions and for guiding actions and
the formation of self-identity. This allows
for autonomous self-governance, which depends on forming intentions that are consistent with one’s narrative understanding
of oneself.
« 30 » Embodied action, however, happens in a world that is not only physical but
also social. Our actions and our decisions
often involve other people; they are often
joint actions steered by physical and social forces and affordances. In this respect,
autonomy is relational (Christman 2004;
Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000). In contrast to
traditional models of an autonomous individual, Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie
Stoljar (2000: 4) suggest that we think of
autonomy “as a characteristic of agents who
are emotional, embodied, desiring, creative,
and feeling, as well as rational, creatures.”
Indeed, our deliberations, and our intentions may be formulated in communicative
practices, and may not be reducible to processes that are exclusive to one individual.
In that sense they may be co-constituted in
one’s interactions with others. They may be
shaped by institutional forces, social practices, and normative expectations. Accordingly, autonomy is a matter of degree, something that is enhanced or reduced by various
physical, social, economic, cultural factors,
our relations with others, as well as our own
narrative practices. Individuals are always
embedded in social contexts, characterized
by intersubjective and normative relations
that can either enhance or impoverish the
control they have over their lives and can
expand or constrict their action possibilities. For this reason, it is best to conceive of
agency, intention, and autonomy in these
embodied and socially situated terms, rather
than in terms of brain processes measured
in milliseconds.
« 31 » Autonomy, as I mentioned, is
closely connected to notions of self-determination, self-legislation, and self-sufficiency,

and even if these are understood in relational terms, it refers us directly to some concept
of self. To understand action and agency we
need to understand the agent, and precisely
what it is that constitutes the agent.

Self
« 32 » There is a long tradition of looking for the self in the brain. Even those who
would deny that the self is reducible to brain
processes consider the self to have a special
relation to the brain. Karl Popper and John
Eccles (1977), for example, defend a dualism
that takes the self to be an autonomous entity
that significantly interacts with and controls
neural processes. “The self-conscious mind
acts upon […] neural centres, modifying
the dynamic spatio-temporal patterns of the
neural events” (Popper & Eccles 1977: 495).
« 33 » There is still great interest in how
various aspects of self relate to brain, or how
specific brain areas correlate with self-related phenomena. Self-referential processes,
including autobiographical knowledge, personal beliefs, self-conceptions, and face selfrecognition are related to left hemisphere
activity (Turk et al. 2003; see also Kircher et
al. 2000) or right frontal cortex (Platek et al.
2003), or right lateral parietal cortex (Lou et
al. 2004) or medial prefrontal cortex bilaterally (Fossati et al. 2003). Moreover, cortical
midline structures (CMS) process information related to self when subjects reflectively
think about themselves, or when they make
judgments about their own personalities
(D’Argembeau et al. 2007; Gutchess et al.
2007; Northoff & Bermpohl 2004; Northoff
et al. 2006; Ruby et al. 2009). Northoff contends that the CMS includes a unitary neural network responsible for all self-related
phenomena (Northoff et al. 2006). The CMS
also connects to subcortical areas, suggesting a relation to an embodied self (Northoff
& Panksepp 2008).
« 34 » Given the diversity and large
number of cortical areas correlated with
self-reference, Seth Gillihan and Martha
Farah (2005) were led to suggest that there
is no specialized brain area responsible for
generating “the self.” Dorothée Legrand and
Perrine Ruby (2009) argue in a complementary way that no area of the brain is exclusively self-specific since “every significant

activation in the [self condition] was also
found in either the [other person condition] or the [general semantic] condition, or
both” (Craik et al. 1999: 30; also Gillihan &
Farah 2005: 94). It thus seems right to say
that the self is both everywhere and nowhere
in the brain (Vogeley & Gallagher 2011). It
is not just that the brain is so complex, however, but also that the concept of self is ambiguous. Accordingly, in any analysis of self
we need to define the precise aspect of the
self under study. Selves consist of a variety
of aspects – experiential, ecological, agentive – and are capable of various forms of
self-recognition, self-related cognition, selfnarrative, and self-specific perception and
action. In this respect, selves are more “inthe-world” than “in-the-brain” (Vogeley &
Gallagher 2011: 129).
« 35 » In contrast to theories that would
reduce the self to one particular type of
thing – for example, a self-model generated by neuronal processes, and nothing
more (e.g., Metzinger 2004); or the abstract
product of narratives, and nothing more
(e.g., Dennett 1991); or nothing more than
a 3-second-long experience sans body or
agency or narrative (Strawson 1999) – pluralist theories suggest that the self is many
things. William James (1950), for example,
distinguished between physical, social, and
private selves. Ulrich Neisser (1988) distinguished ecological, interpersonal, conceptual, extended, and private selves. In an attempt to capture the plurality of self-related
factors and the idea that the agentive self is
more “in-the-world” than “in the brain,” I
have proposed a pattern theory of self (Gallagher 2013b). In brief, the pattern theory of
self (PTS) argues that a self is constituted as
a pattern or dynamical Gestalt comprised of
a sufficient number of characteristic factors,
including embodied, experiential, affective,
behavioral, intersubjective, psychological/
cognitive, reflective, narrative, extended
and normative factors (see Table 1). It is
important to note that this is not an additive list of factors; rather these components
or aspects are dynamically interrelated in a
pattern or Gestalt arrangement (Gallagher
& Daly 2018). Accordingly, a change in one
element, above a certain threshold, will lead,
via dynamical interactions, to changes in
others. For example, as suggested above, aspects of self-experience, such as the sense of
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Brief description

Embodied elements

Core biological, ecological and interoceptive factors, allowing the
system to distinguish between itself and what is not itself –
extremely basic to all kinds of animal behavior.

Minimal experiential
elements

First-person, pre-reflective, conscious experience, reflecting the self/
non-self distinction, manifest in various sensory-motor modalities
(kinaesthesia, proprioception, touch, vision, etc.) – including a sense of
ownership (the “mineness” of one’s experience) and a sense of agency
for one’s actions (Gallagher 2012; Rochat 2011).

Affective aspects

Affect/emotion/temperament, ranging from bodily affects to what may
be a typical affective or emotion pattern (Newen, Welpinghus & Juckel
2015).

Behavioral aspects

Behaviors and actions make us who we are – behavioral habits
reflect, and perhaps actually constitute, our character. This is a
classic view that goes back at least to Aristotle.

Intersubjective
interactions and
capacities

Human are born with a capacity for attuning to intersubjective
existence, which develops into a social self-consciousness – a self-forothers (Mead 1913), manifested behaviorally in mirror self-recognition
(Gallup, Anderson & Platek 2011), joint actions and communicative
practices.

Psychological/cognitive
elements

Traditional theories of the self focus on these factors, which may
range from explicit self-consciousness to a conceptual understanding
of self as self, to personality traits of which one may not be selfconscious at all – psychological continuity and the importance of
memory are highlighted in the literature on personal identity.

Reflective capacities

The ability to reflect on one’s experiences and actions – closely
related to the notions of autonomy and moral personhood, including
the capacity to reflect and form second-order volitions about one’s
desires (Frankfurt 1982; Taylor 1989).

Narrative capacities

Although some theorists make the strong claim that narratives are
constitutive for selves (Schechtman 2011), for PTS one can lose the
ability to construct a self-narrative (as in cases of dysnarrativa) and
still remain a self to the extent that other elements of the pattern
remain in place.

Extended/situated
elements

Including the possibilities presented by physical pieces of property,
and various things that we own (James 1950). Not only may we
identify with our material belongings, o r the technologies we use,
our professions and the institutions we work in, but we are also
dynamically related to the action possibilities they afford.

Normative factors

Ranging across possibilities presented by the kind of family structure
and situation in which we grew up to cultural and normative practices,
involving physical and mental health, gender, race, and economic
status, that define our way of living.

Table 1 • Dynamical aspects of the self-pattern (from Gallagher & Daly 2018).
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agency, can be modulated by other complex,
relational aspects, such as social, normative
factors that involve culture, gender, race,
health, etc., and by specific intersubjective
factors that can either diminish or enhance
one’s autonomy and sense of agency. There
is much more to say about PTS and about
how to investigate the dynamical aspects of
the self-pattern (see Gallagher & Daly 2018).
Here, however, my intention is simply to
note that a self-pattern is more than a neural
pattern. This does not mean that there is no
connection between self and brain. Indeed,
changes in neurophysiology can “index”
changes in the self-pattern (Fingelkurts &
Fingelkurts 2017).
« 36 » Within the framework of predictive processing (PP), Jakub Limanowski and
Felix Blankenburg (2013: 1), for example,
argue that the minimal (pre-reflective) experiential aspects of the bodily self can be
“mapped onto a hierarchical generative
model […] and may constitute the basis
for higher-level, cognitive forms of self-referral.” On the same model affective factors
may involve multisensory integration (Seth
2013) that also relate to self-recognition
(Apps & Tsakiris 2014). Matthew Apps and
Manos Tsakiris also note the influence of
culturally shaped priors on PP:
There is also evidence of more long-term con“textual
influences on self-recognition related
priors, highlighted by the role that cultural and
societal effects have on self-other decision-making. For instance, self-other face recognition has
been shown to be different across cultures […].
(ibid: 14)

”

Once again, these dynamical neural and
extra-neural integrations reflect the various
dynamical relations between the embodied
and experiential aspects of the self-pattern
and the extended and normative aspects. To
paraphrase Friston, the agent does not have
a self, it is a self, where the self is not a model
in the brain but a pattern of generative dynamics coordinated across the elements of
brain, body and environment.
« 37 » Importantly, on a PP approach,
self-specific neural processing may arise in
any multisensory processing, thereby avoiding problems (outlined above) involved in
positing specialized circuits or parts of the
brain that are self-specific. Indeed, Apps and
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Tsakiris (2014: 8) claim that a PP account
“provides flexibility, with fewer constraints
on what types of information can drive selfrecognition.” The strong claim is that predictive models can explain all of the various
factors that contribute to the self-pattern. As
they note,
This is particularly important, given the evi“dence
to suggest that the continuity of the self
may be underpinned by many different types of
information, the integration of which leads to a
coherent sense of one’s body. (ibid: 9)

”

« 38 » To be clear, this type of analysis

sends us back to issues previously discussed
(in the section on perception) about how
we might best interpret predictive processing models. Although Hohwy and John Michael (2017) build an internalist PP model
of self, it is interesting to note that they
see their account as consistent with PP accounts of minimal phenomenal (experiential) selfhood, or self model (Limanowski &
Blankenburg 2013; Metzinger 2004), bodily
self-awareness (Apps & Tsakiris 2014), interoceptive aspects (Seth, Suzuki & Critchley
2011), intersubjective aspects that relate self
and other (Moutoussis et al. 2014), social understanding of self and other (Frith & Friston
2015), and psychodynamical notions of self
(e.g., Fotopoulou 2012), thereby touching on
many elements of the self-pattern. All of this,
however, on their account, is reducible to the
brain’s predictive model. Rather than taking
the fully embodied self to be the agent of active inference, or part of a dynamical system
that includes the brain, Hohwy and Michael
take the body to be a representation in the
internal model of the agent:
The body is nothing special, it is just one
“among
many causes interacting with each other
in the environment, and in the course of this impacting on the senses. Representation of the body
is nothing special either; it is just one among
many causes that get represented in the internal
model used for prediction error minimization.
(Hohwy & Michael 2017: 367f)

”

« 39 » In contrast to reducing the self

to neuronal patterns, or to the patterns of
inference that constitute a self-model, PTS
argues that the self-pattern is a “real pattern” (Dennett 1991) of dynamical relations

among brain-body-environment (broadly
speaking). Such dynamical relations may be
partially indexed or traced by neuronal processes to the extent that the latter partially
underpin various factors of the self-pattern,
but they are not reducible to such processes.
One important component of this pattern
includes the agent’s intersubjective interactions and capacities for social cognition,
phenomena that are clearly more than just
brain processes.

Social cognition
« 40 » Standard approaches to social
cognition (theory of mind – ToM) typically
accept the assumption of methodological individualism. Although ToM seeks to
explain how we understand the minds of
others, via mindreading processes, all those
processes are said to be contained in the
observer’s own head/brain. Either a theory
of mind module (ToMM) in pre-frontal
areas activates subpersonal processes that
constitute a “tacit theory” or implicit use of
folk psychology (Carruthers 2015), or mirror neurons generate subpersonal processes
that simulate the actions and minds of others (Gallese 2001; Goldman 2006).
« 41 » The alternative phenomenological-enactive approach to social cognition,
interaction theory (IT), rejects the idea that
we mindread the hidden mental states of
others. It focuses on embodied interaction
processes that draw on multiple semiotic
resources in the other’s postures, movements, gestures, facial expressions, vocal
intonations, communicative practices and
actions in contextualized social and cultural environments. This includes an enactive model of direct social perception of the
other person’s embodied mental states (especially intentions and emotions) (De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher 2010; Gallagher
2005, 2008a; Reddy 2008). For example, if
emotional episodes, as Giovanna Colombetti suggests:
to specific self-organizing forms
“or correspond
second-order constraints – emotion forms, as
I call them – that recruit or entrain various processes (neural, muscular, autonomic, etc.) into
highly integrated configurations or patterns.
(Colombetti 2014: 69)

”

and if these patterns include bodily expressions, comportments, and actions, then
(consistent with what we said in previous
sections) my perception of another person’s emotions may be considered a form
of perceptual pattern recognition – one that
is action- (or interaction-) oriented and
takes that pattern as a social affordance for
further response on my part. On this view
we are not engaged in third-person observation of others, but in second-person (“Ithou” or “we-mode”) interactions. In contrast to methodological individualism, what
does the work of social cognition are not
mechanisms internal to the individual, but
our engaged interactions that happen in our
shared, intersubjective world and that build
on shared or reciprocal social affordances.
« 42 » Scientific evidence for this is
found in developmental studies of infants,
from birth onward, in their face-to-face,
primary intersubjective relations, and their
pragmatically contextualized secondary intersubjective relations (Trevarthen 1979).
Primary intersubjectivity involves innate or
early-developing sensory-motor capacities
that bring us into relation with others and
allow us to interact with them. In part, these
capacities involve action and perceptual experience – we are able to see or more generally perceive in the other person’s bodily
postures, movements, gestures, facial expressions, gaze direction, vocal intonation,
etc. what they intend and what they feel.
We respond with our own bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions, gaze, etc.
On this view, the other’s mind is in her embodied comportment, and manifests itself
in second-person interactions. For infants,
these highly embodied and situated interactions form the basis for a developing understanding of others.
« 43 » Infants already have a sense, from
their own self-movement and proprioception, of their own agency, and they see this
kind of agency in others. They respond,
interactively, to certain kinds of entities
(specifically to other agents) in the environment. They can respond in a distinctive way
to human faces (Johnson 2000; Johnson,
Slaughter & Carey 1998; Legerstee 1991), for
example. From birth infants are capable of
perceiving and responding to facial gestures
presented by others, and seem to be directly
attuned to the actions and gestures of other
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humans (Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1994; Gallagher & Meltzoff 1996). Although claims
about neonatal imitation remain controversial, this is not a worry for IT. Whether it is
differential imitation or a mere arousal response (Anisfeld 2005; Keven & Akins 2017;
Jones 2006, 2009; but see Nagy et al. 2013;
Nagy, Pal & Orvos 2014; Vincini et al. 2017a,
2017b; Vincini & Jhang 2018) it nonetheless
leads infant and caregiver to intersubjective interaction. An initial adult facial gesture may motivate the infant’s arousal and
response; in turn the infant’s response has
an effect on the adult who is encouraged to
continue with facial games, etc. In this way,
even a mere arousal response could facilitate
early social interaction.
« 44 » Primary intersubjectivity can be
specified in much more detail. At 2 months,
infants are already attuned to the other person’s attention; they follow the other’s head
movements and gaze (Baron-Cohen 1995;
Maurer & Barrera 1981). Also at 2 months,
second-person interaction is evidenced by
the timing and emotional response of infants’ behavior (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997).
This is part of a mutual attunement that
characterizes interactions and that can be
specified in detail in their dynamical relations and the integration of the intrinsic
temporalities of the agents’ movements
(Trevarthen 1999; Trevarthen et al. 2006).
At 5–7 months infants can detect visualaudio correspondences specifying the expression of emotions (Walker 1982; Hobson
1993, 2002). At 6 months they see grasping
as goal-directed. At 10–11 months infants
can parse intentional boundaries within
some kinds of continuous action (Baldwin
& Baird 2001; Baird & Baldwin 2001; Woodward & Sommerville 2000).
« 45 » Such expressions, intonations,
gestures, and movements do not float freely
in the air; they are situated in the world,
anchored to specific contexts. Accordingly,
towards the end of the first year, infants start
to notice how others engage with the world.
For joint attention and secondary intersubjectivity context becomes very important,
and it helps us to intersubjectively co-constitute the meaning of the world.
« 46 » A good example of secondary intersubjectivity can be found in conversation
analysis, the rich analysis of speech acts situated in circumstances that involve our own
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and others’ postures and movements, along
with environmental arrangements and affordances (Goodwin 2000, 2017). Charles
Goodwin shows that meaning emerges
in action and interaction, specifically at
the intersection of social, cultural, material and temporal structures of the environment. Meaning is accomplished, not just via
speech but by drawing on “different kinds
of semiotic resources” available in the environment and in whole-body pragmatics.
“For example, spoken language builds signs
within the stream of speech, gestures use the
body in a particular way, while posture and
orientation use the body in another, etc.”
Goodwin emphasizes the “visible, public
deployment of multiple semiotic fields that
mutually elaborate each other” (ibid: 1494):
vocal intonations (some of which have a deontic rather than descriptive force); movements, postures and bodily orientations;
instituted norms; references to completed
actions; interruption of activities, and so on.
« 47 » As an example, Goodwin provides a detailed analysis of a dispute between
two young girls over a game of hopscotch.
Unlike talk, gestures can’t be heard. [This
“means]
Carla [one of the girls] actively works to
position her hand gestures so that they will be
perceived by Diana [the other girl] […] Carla’s
hand is explicitly positioned in Diana’s line of
sight […] thrusting the gesturing hand toward
Diana’s face twists Carla’s body into a configuration in which her hand, arm and the upper part
of her torso are actually leaning toward Diana.
(Goodwin 2001: 1498)

”

« 48 » The proximity of the gesture to
the other girl’s face has meaning. If it were
a touch rather than a gesture, how hard or
soft, and where the touch occurred would
also have meaning.
« 49 » Importantly, interaction is not
one-sided. A response draws a further response. In the interaction, the conversation
is not confined to vocalization and gesture
– reference is made to the surrounding environment, joint attention is established and
then broken and then re-established. The
accomplishment of meaning is not under
the control of just one individual; rather it
depends upon two-way interaction. According to IT, social understanding builds
on precisely this complex integration of pri-

mary and secondary intersubjective capacities, situated within pragmatic and social
contexts, supplemented with and supporting communicative and narrative processes.
In this regard, it is the interaction itself that
contributes something not reducible to the
actions of the individuals involved, or to individual brain states (De Jaegher, Di Paolo &
Gallagher 2010).
« 50 » IT does not deny that the brain is
an important part of the body or that it plays
an important role in cognition and social
cognition. Indeed, mirror neurons, motor
control processes, and notions of reuse may
play some role in explaining social cognition. It is reasonable to think that reuse is
in some way constrained by original use. If
so, then the fact that our perceptual-motor
systems were originally designed for action,
rather than for observation, is significant
(Anderson & Chemero 2017). It is likely that
this action orientation carries through to
the reuse of our motor systems in contexts
of social cognition, but again (as I indicated
in §§13–14) this requires a reinterpretation
of reuse in relation to wider contexts involving metaplasticity. Thus, I see your action as
an affordance that motivates my own action
– I see it as something I can respond to in
broader contexts of social interactions, joint
actions, cultural practices, etc., and that is
precisely how I understand your action.
« 51 » The interaction that is essential
to social cognition is not reducible to the
interaction of neurons; it requires agentive
bodies, and others, situated in physical, social, cultural and normatively constrained
environments in support of interactions that
happen in the world rather than in individual brains.

Conclusion
« 52 » Since the 1990s, the assumption
in cognitive science has been that neuroscience will at some point replace psychology
and that we will adjust our philosophies of
mind accordingly (Gazzaniga 1998). The
expectation was that the best explanation of
brain function would be worked out in the
vocabulary of neuroscience. In contrast, I
want to suggest that the best explanation of
brain function may be found in the vocabularies of embodied and situated cognition,
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developmental psychology, ecological psychology, dynamic systems theory, applied
linguistics, the theory of affordances, along
with the anthropological insights found in
discussions that extend from concepts of
cultural niche to material engagement. There
is a methodological question involved here:
whether neuroscience can start to speak this
different language and enter into the right
kind of dialogue. There is also a substantial
question: how do brains operate in the complex and dynamical mix of interactions that
involve perceiving, moving, gesturing, acting, emoting and expressing bodies?

The nervous system emerges from a preneural
“dynamic.
Thus when the nervous excitation occurs,

to think of the nervous sys“temIt asis anconventional
organ that monitors and motivates the

« 54 » In this article I have considered
a sampling of research areas in the cognitive sciences – perception, agency, self and
social cognition. In each case I have argued
against a narrow or neurocentric reductionism. These are basic phenomena upon
which many cognitive capacities are built.
One could easily see the same principles
at work in a number of other areas where
more comprehensive accounts have been
developed by taking embodied, ecological,
enactive and extended approaches seriously – for example, research on memory
(Sutton 2010), expert performance (Høffding 2015; Ilundáin-Agurruza 2016), collective intentionality (Tollefsen & Gallagher
2017), psychopathology (Gallagher 2013c),
and psychotherapy (Garcia & Di Paolo 2018;
Röhricht et al. 2014). In each case one can
acknowledge the importance of what the

body rather than an organ controlled by the body
[…]. Nevertheless, the body’s influence on the
nervous system is as important for the organism as is neural dominion over the body. (Purves
1988: 1)
« 53 » That the body essentially constrains and “pushes” the organization of the
brain through its dynamic behavioral interaction with the environment was already
well documented by George Coghill (1929),
in Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his 1957–58 lectures on the concept of nature, was inspired
by Coghill’s work for setting the principles
of dynamic anatomy in opposition to strict
determinism, and he provides an appropriate conclusion.

it can’t play an important role in the organization
of the nervous system. This organization is not so
much due to the functioning of the neuron as to the
growth of the total organism. The preneural system
of integration ‘strides across’ the nervous functioning and it doesn’t stop when it appears. So the nervous system can’t be the ultimate explanation. Then
we must admit an intrinsic potentiality of growth,
a dynamic system reacting to its surroundings as
an organism would do. It replaces the function of
conduction as being a consequence, not a principle
of the system. (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 192)

”

brain is doing, operating as part of a larger
circuit that includes body and environment.
The brain is not at the center of a circle with
radii of control extending to other elements;
it is one component arranged in the circuit,
or in what Viktor von Weizsäcker (1986)
called a Gestalt circle of brain, body, and the
(physical, social, cultural) environment.
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